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Let us begin with a clarification about the starting and ending
points of the present contribution, ca. 1919 and 1920 respectively:
Both years are to be taken not in strict and binding chronological
succession, but rather in a logical, historical and historiographical
sense. Considering both published and unpublished papers, one
finds that already before the economic crisis of 1907 some of the
best financial minds of the time (from Lexis to Wolf, from Knapp
to Luzzatti) operated in a classic gold-standard multipolar system.
They rooted their theoretical positions not only in specific disci-
plinary dictates (anchoring them to more or less intrinsic links with
domestic policies and international economies), but also in the con-
cepts (or principles) of credibility and cooperation. Barry Eichen-
green says that this echoed public confidence in the commitments
made by government to a certain policy line. He insists on the im-
portance of the links between finance and the real economy, sus-
tained with different arguments by Kindleberger and Temin, as
well as by Friedman and Schwartz, who relate those links to the
propagation of the effects of crises. This was particularly evident
in the United States, marked by bank failures and a subsequent
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liquidity crunch, as pointed out by numerous authors, from Rozen-
raad to Bonelli.
Some instances of the above-mentioned issues can be found not
only in contemporary events, but also in the acts of the Latin Union,
the Scandinavian Union and the German Union, and in the mone-
tary conferences of 1867, ’78, ’81,’85 and, especially, ’92 when Julius
Wolf outlined the idea (later partially implemented in Bretton
Woods) of depositing a gold reserve in a neutral country in order to
issue international bank notes. On this point Wolf basically agrees
with Luzzatti, although the latter’s views are fuelled not only by re-
alism, but also, so to speak, by ideality. In truth, this difference is not
to be underestimated, especially when there is a shortage of liquid-
ity, when there is a need for money and the solvency of the national
economy and especially of bank notes is called into question. Fast
and effective help is then required. Such financial assistance can con-
sist in transferring gold from an issuing bank to a kindred bank of
another State, although establishing rigid rules and stipulating con-
tracts a priori could, at the very least, be risky, given the different
economic circumstances and political relations of the parties in-
volved. Banks that at any given time are still able to offer gold to
other countries should not, however, commit themselves in the long
term, so that agreements only contemplate the opening of negotia-
tions when the need arises. In other words, it would be a matter of
establishing a practice that would occur without any binding provi-
sion. Such an agreement would necessarily be more formal, but in
times of scarcity every bank could keep its gold for itself, since its
position would become weaker if it tried to strengthen that of other
parties. It is therefore necessary to keep an eye on services that can-
not easily be regulated, for, as Wolf points out, they can be rendered
even less easily.
Knapp starts from a different viewpoint, supporting the chartal-
ist thesis that money does not have an intrinsic value per se but is a
“creation of law”. If the argument is simply that a State can “declare
legal tender an object […] or pay-token or ticket”, and that such a
“proclamation” has “considerable effectiveness” in imparting on
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that same warrant “a certain value”, this is an obvious truth, indeed
even “a platitudinous one”; if, instead, the contention is that the ac-
tion of the State is sufficient to determine “the value of that pay-
token”, this assertion results in “an interesting but false
proposition”.
Luzzatti appreciates Wolf and Knapp, but has even greater es-
teem for Lexis, a professor at the University of Göttingen and per-
haps the greatest student of monetary questions in the early
twentieth century. Luzzatti is familiar not so much with Lexis’s sta-
tistical writings, but rather with his so-called mark-up theory. In
what does Luzzatti follow Lexis and where do they differ? A point
of convergence lies in the shared goal of desiring to avoid financial
crises as far as possible and to find forms of international monetary
cooperation: this objective comes from afar, in the sense that some
traces of it can be found in the mid-1850s and still more from the
mid-1870s onwards, when Luzzatti, studying the methods used by
the National Bank of Belgium to defend its gold reserves, proposed
that the National Bank in the Kingdom of Italy be authorized to hold
part of its reserves in interest-bearing accounts with foreign banks
and in foreign bills, thus anticipating a gold-exchange-standard
logic. In other words, Luzzatti understands that, especially for small
countries, the problem of monetary stability lies in the cost of the re-
serves and in the difficulty of getting gold or silver “when large fi-
nancial centres [...], by raising the discount rate, convince their
short-term investors to temporarily repatriate their capital”. It fol-
lows that small debtor countries are subjected to “sudden departures
of metal, finding themselves forced to repay their debts on demand”.
Luzzatti’s beliefs are supported by other events during the
1880s, when the abolition of the fiat money system and the restora-
tion of metallic convertibility at nominal parity occurred amidst po-
tential national and international instability that would worsen in
the following decade. These developments came on top of the ten-
sions caused by the new polycentrism of the financial system, which
changed the patterns of pre-existing economic relations and stoked
the main central banks’ appetite for gold. To slow this “gold rush”,
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Luzzatti suggests creating a supranational body with the aim of “au-
tomatically recycling reserves between financial centres that lose
them and centres [...] that gain them as a result of short-term capital
movements induced by interest rate rises”. This leads to his proposal
not only to create a stable body to deal with the international circu-
lation of gold, the regulation of stock exchanges and the unification
of international financial law, but also to promote an international
convention empowered to dictate shared rules in order to guarantee
a monetary order. One of these rules is to regulate gold advances
that banks should grant each other, not excluding, and indeed fore-
seeing, the ability to examine banks’ portfolios.
How to achieve this hoped-for banking solidarity? Whatever the
answer, issuing banks, in order to honour their obligations, trade
tickets at any time and return deposits without delay, need security
and must be able to collect advances and loans when they fall due.
American treasury bills issued against gold and having coupons
payable in Europe are accepted with confidence by issuing banks,
even without complying with their statutory provisions. As for Luz-
zatti, he agrees with Lexis that issuing banks do not make loans in
gold because of “fraternal feelings”. Gold, he explains, “has no guts!
But it is the clear and prominent vision of economic interest that has
often led the Bank of France to help that of England and which has
persuaded the Austro-Hungarian Bank to help [that] of the German
Empire”. This does not mean that in such affairs the sentiment of
brotherhood should replace the logic of self-interest. Instead, it can
be affirmed that “in trade treaties, in postal and telegraphic unions,
in all other economic institutions that consider the world in its great
entirety, it is not a feeling of brotherhood that determines the com-
monality of business, [but rather] it is retrospectively that of the use-
fulness of common affairs that gives rise to the persuasion of the
existence of a human brotherhood”.
At an operational level, considering how to contain gold move-
ments and money market tensions, Luzzatti looks, on the one hand,
at the Postal Union, which by then had become a large and efficient
clearing house, and, on the other, at small issuing banks, which on
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several occasions had taught “what big ones should have done”. The
reference is not only to the National Bank of Belgium, but also, for
example, to the Bank of Romania, as well as to the national banks of
Norway and Sweden, whose collaboration in 1905 was decisive at
the time of the political separation between the two countries. Al-
ready in 1912, in Brussels, Luzzatti asked and obtained that the In-
ternational Economic Union be an active party in setting up a
clearing agreement between participating issuing institutions. He
supported the use of monetary conventions, as “indispensable
means to make possible the cooperation among issuing banks in ex-
ceptional contingencies”.
In August 1915, during the Italo-French conference in Cernob-
bio, Luzzatti proposed that an international committee be set up in
Paris to curb speculation and lay the foundations for a world clear-
ing house. This proposal was later taken up in the International
Trade Conference held in the French capital in 1916, during which
Luzzatti recommended an agenda that would lead to the appoint-
ment of a standing committee charged with “studying and suggest-
ing all measures capable of attenuating gold movements and of
establishing a clearing house with the aim of moderating exchange
tensions amongst allied countries”.
After the hostilities ended, monetary instability became a prob-
lem not only in Italy but also in France and England, where opera-
tions to support the respective currencies ceased. This situation was
generated both by a veritable “ticket flooding” and by the disap-
pearance of a robust system whose core lay in the free trade of gold.
But how to restore a framework of stability? This question could be
answered only after other issues had been solved, first and foremost
the dilemma: price stability or exchange-rate stability? Plainly, the
immediate resumption of the convertibility of gold tickets was nei-
ther necessary nor possible. In contrast with the past, the mechanism
of gold points was altered by what Ugo Papi termed “one of the
most serious problems of the post-war period”, namely gold specie
movements. Paul Einzig claims that these were promoted mainly by
various countries’ issuing to increase their reserves, by international
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loans, which by convention had to be settled in gold, and by fore-
casts of unfavourable developments for the exchange rate and do-
mestic currency in some countries. These phenomena threw the
question of the stability of the value of money into even greater re-
lief, fuelling a lively debate which, in addition to the classic contrasts
between inflationists and deflationists and between chartalists and
advocates of a return to gold, saw old projects dusted off in an at-
tempt to escape what De Stefani called the “severe and overbearing
law of gold”. In this regard, let us cite the 1867 idea of the “Com-
mission on International Coinage” to create an international cur-
rency, later developed by Jevons, and the plan for the “compensated
dollar” proposed by Fisher. Also, Nicholson’s far-sighted proposals,
Martello’s project to suppress the legal relationship between gold
and silver and to create a new commodity currency, Messedaglia’s
considerations on the “immaterial currency” ideal, and Lehr’s com-
plicated system based on the so-called “enjoyment unit”, not to men-
tion Solvay’s “social accounting” and Lowe’s “tabular system”.
Severe monetary disturbances made the limitations of some of
these projects even more evident, injecting the poison of monetary
instability. In the past, gold had been used de facto as an interna-
tional currency which could serve as a fairly precise, though not
fixed, measure of the value of any other currency. However, during
the war and after it, gold was no longer able to represent the exact
measure of prices in the relationships among different countries, for
it had largely vanished from circulation and was unequally dis-
tributed. Monetary stability becomes the leitmotiv of every
economist: from Keynes to Hawtrey, from Gide to Pigou, from
Alessio to Pantaleoni, not to mention Achille Loria, who offers a mer-
ciless analysis of the reference framework in Le peripezie monetarie
della Guerra [The Monetary Twists and Turns of the War]. On closer
inspection, the 1922 Genoa conference reached the same conclusion:
“An essential condition for Europe’s economic reconstruction is that
every nation can stabilize its currency”. But how to achieve stability?
Some paid attention to the modified concept of stability: with the
shift from the gold standard to the gold exchange standard, stability
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would depend not only on gold but also on the stability of currencies
equivalent to gold. Obviously, it would be relative stability, set in an
international context of economic instability, where many projects
collided with what Einaudi called “the myth of the immutable mon-
etary unit”. This helps explain the different solutions that were pro-
posed, some of them definitely original: – for instance, Euby
Vanderlip’s project, presented at the Portorose Conference, to create
a federal bank among European States, modelled on the US Federal
Reserve; or Dundas White’s idea for an international gold coin,
called dor.
Those who harked back to the pre-war gold system to bring the
circulation back to “normal” conditions suggested that it was nec-
essary to pursue rigorous budgetary policies, limit fiduciary circu-
lation, strengthen metal reserves, and aim at balancing external
accounts. The question was whether to reduce the value of the legal
currency to that of the real currency, due to its devaluation, or to con-
sider a revaluation of the legal currency that would make the cur-
rency’s real price match its legal footprint. As Lexis points out, this
controversial matter also poses legal questions, for where a premium
has existed for many years, the prices of goods adapt to the decrease
in the currency’s value. It follows that all bonds are measured ac-
cording to the less valued monetary unit, unless payments in gold
are expressly agreed upon. In this situation, bringing the real value
of a long-depreciated currency back to its legal value would imply
an unfair burden on debtors and an illegitimate enrichment for cred-
itors. Moreover, while there was indeed an attempt to restore the
gold standard, it soon became clear that restoring the gold standard
and defining pre-war parity were not synonymous, and that restor-
ing the gold standard could not be the end goal of economic policy
but rather a legitimate ambition. In this regard, we recall that in Jan-
uary 1918 the Cunliffe Committee did not pay any great attention
to the pound’s return to the gold standard, taking it for granted. The
only questions to settle were timing, methods and exchange-rate fix-
ing. Keynes’s critical judgment of the Cunliffe report is well known,
as is his view that the gold standard was a “barbarous relic”.
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However, many believed that gold-based monetary systems
were not suited to the new circumstances. In this respect, Cassel
writes: “The only quality necessary for a monetary regime to pro-
mote trade and the world’s well-being is stability. If the war and
what it brought about have upset the world monetary regimes, this
is not a reason to try and re-establish the situation that existed before
the war. In itself, it had no essential character. Its main advantage
was the high degree of stability achieved at that time, and it is this
stability that we must try and restore”.
Paolo Baffi remarks that the efficiency loss of the regulatory
mechanisms that followed the First World War created the need for
greater collaboration in general and, still more, with respect to the
relationships among individual countries or groups of countries:
that is, among the countries issuing reserve currencies, between
those countries and France, a major gold holder, and between cred-
itors and debtors of war loans and reparations.
It is beyond the scope of this short contribution to dwell on the
meanings of the term “collaboration”, or on the differences between
issuing institutions and central banks. In 1920, Gérard Vissering, ad-
dressing the Brussels conference, considered cooperation between
central banks to be “indispensable”, but collaboration between the
latter and private banks is no less important. To be clear, the control
that the Bank of England exercised for many years on the money
market would be incomprehensible without considering its relation-
ship with the big five.
While collecting his Note e cifre su la circolazione cartacea e il mer-
cato monetario [Notes and Figures on the Circulation of Paper Money
and the Money Market], a revised version of which would be trans-
lated into French on the eve of the Brussels Conference, Bonaldo
Stringher, Director of the Bank of Italy, wondered: Will domestic ef-
forts be sufficient without an effective concurrence of international
agreements? But above all, to what extent is the stability of a cur-
rency linked to operators’ expectations? It was hoped that the Brus-
sels Conference would provide an answer, but, according to
Luzzatti, the conference was poorly organized and reached unsatis-
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factory results. The gathering, which should have led to the creation
of a “standing committee able to monitor, adjust, regulate [...] the
great monetary flows of the world”, turned – I quote – into a “colour-
ful financial conference”. Similarly, Stringher, in the Bank of Italy’s
1920 report to shareholders, declared: “The financial conference in
Brussels, [...] though full of news and studies, and even richer in
memories and scientific discourses, proved sterile, in reality, as far
as practical results are concerned”.
In the “Babel of Brussels”, what Luzzatti had feared actually oc-
curred. The resolutions were concise, an expression more of good
intentions than of concrete measures, except for the “rudimentary”
design of an international bank and, above all, the recommendation
to the League of Nations to create an International Clearing House
for currency exchanges.
The numerous and complex reasons for that failure were not
purely cyclical. Doubt was cast on credibility and cooperation, ele-
ments underpinning the classical gold standard, and, as Eichengreen
points out, the system that was gradually taking shape, “despite the
similarities with its predecessor, shares few of its virtues”. It should
also be borne in mind that in the immediate post-war period, in the
choice between stability and growth, many European countries,
starting with Italy, opted to stress growth, in a context in which gold,
as Demaria observed, was “scarce and poorly distributed”.
The transition from the gold standard to the gold exchange standard
reproduced in a supranational perspective the issue of abandoning
gold circulation in favour of a fiduciary paper currency convertible
into gold. Historically, this constituted the preparatory step to the
adoption of a fiat money system, if only because the promise of con-
vertibility weakened as the issuing institutions printed paper in ex-
cess of its coverage. This brought the final stage closer,
corresponding to the Platonic ideal of conventional money. As Peter
Mathias explains, the problem was exacerbated by the fact that cen-
tral banks lost their autonomy, becoming instruments of State policy
and conducting actions that violated the very essence of their tradi-
tional behaviour. Furthermore, cooperation followed the same
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method as secret diplomacy, working behind closed doors. At vari-
ous monetary conferences, leadership rested with the main central
banks or, better, with the two men who headed them in that context:
Benjamin Strong and Montagu Norman.
The importance of personal relationships and the complexity of
the circumstances escaped neither Attilio Cabiati, who offered a
lucid examination of them in his essay “Problemi economici dell’I-
talia alla Conferenza di Parigi” [Italy’s Economic Problems at the
Paris Conference] nor Francesco Saverio Nitti, who worried that Eu-
rope might well risk decline more because of peace treaties than be-
cause of war. The same can be said of Luzzatti, for whom monetary
stability was the precondition not just for monetary peace but for
peace in general.
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